Thanks u/Plemethrock
We can have a discussion on whether or not free will exists. Discuss if every action we do is already predetermined by how our brain is wired, with the environment around us being the inputs.
We can also have a discussion on whether or not humans have souls and analyze the evidence for and against us just being our bodies
(I made an error and had to repost, apologies)
You just agreed with my position (that God causing all the evil in the world doesn't make him evil) while claiming to be arguing against me.
That was never my argument. My argument is this. If a non-deterministic action A makes outcome X a certainty when an alternative action B would have made not-X a certainty then A is the ultimate cause of X. If additionally A is performed by an agent who is aware that A will make X happen while B would have avoided X then the agent deliberately causes X. Therefore if God wasn't pre-determined to create a universe that certainly (as proved by his foreknowledge) led to evil (action A leading to X) and could have chose not to create (action B leading to not-X), but yet he did, it follows that God creating the universe was the ultimate cause of evil in the universe. Additionally God was aware this action would lead to evil in the universe while the alternative would have avoided it, so therefore God deliberately caused evil in the universe.
Which part of this argument is wrong? Notice I said nothing about causing evil being evil, God being morally accountable for causing evil or humans lacking accountability for their role in bringing the evil about.
You need to define what a secondary causal agent is. In a row of dominoes ending with a button you can call the second domino a "secondary causal agent" but it doesn't change the fact that if laws of physics are deterministic then the fall of the first domino causes the button to get pressed. Same thing if a general orders a soldier to kill someone - we say the general caused the death, regardless of the fact that there was a soldier who also caused the death and could have opted to disobey orders.
Citation needed. We all know people can love and make choices yet it is conceivable that these things happen via deterministic mental processes. If you say that a deterministic love cannot be love then you are simply defining love to be something that humans may not be capable of.
That's a strawman. I explicitly said God doesn't cause ANY evil in any way shape or form because it's contrary to His nature. Everything God does is good, true and just.
The part that's wrong is that you equivocate between primary and secondary causation. But the argument is not even valid when talking about secondary causation (created causes). Here's a very clear example:
If I have a son and I do a great job being a good father, but still my son, who's now an adult, falls into bad habits and eventually commits murder, am I responsible for the evil caused by him?
I'd say the whole argument as you put it begs the question because it assumes determinism and takes away the ability of real choice from the equation. Just like I said in the comment above - you presuppose physicalist domino-effect causality (A-> B-> C) where each each cause is the predetermined effect of a previous cause and acts a certain with no free will - basically it behaves like an inanimate physical object (so naturally, you arrive to determinism and the circle is complete).
Aristotle is cool and all, but like all ancient philosophers, he took a lot of things for granted because at that point no one was questioning the foundational ideas about metaphysics and epistemology. Many centuries passed before Descartes and later Hume, Kant and the existentialists had the ball rolling questioning foundational beliefs.
Secondary causation refers to the created causes we normally talk about (fire causes heat, choices cause actions, medicine causes healing, etc.) These causes are real and effective, operating according to their own natures.
No, you can't because a domino is an inanimate object and not an agent. Agent refers to a rational being capable making choices which influences other objects and agents in the universe.
That's because in that context, the soldier is supposed to defer his personal assessment and act as a tool, an extension of the higher-up's will. Also, in the many cases soldiers are also held responsible for not disobeying orders on some occasions like the nazi executions. This a deontological and ethical question about when "I was just following orders" is appropriate and when it's not (and who gets to decide where the line is drawn).
But if determinism is true, the general isn't responsible too, because he's simply a domino down the causal chain. Responsibility, justice or any moral judgement is nonsensical in that system.
First of all, if determinism is true it's not simply about people not having free will and choice - that's just the surface of the problem as normies see it. Philosophically, it also leads to the impossibility of knowledge and truth. Why? Because truth necessitates a choice between the true and the false. But if every mind in existence is predetermined, no real evaluation of a given proposition ever takes place (I'm predetermined to say A is true, and you - B is true and at no tie-breaker is possible because C is also predetermined to output either A or B).
If determinism is the case, all that there is is matter governed by predetermined chemical reactions, that are effects of previous reactions and so on going back to the First cause. Where is love in that equation? Do you mean more predetermined chemical reactions? I highly doubt many people will agree on that definition (not an appeal to majority, just saying). Is the water boiling at 100 degrees any different than love? What's the meaningful distinction between me loving something vs the opposite?
You conflate free will with moral accountability. Arguing for/against one is not arguing for/against another. You also conflate determinism with materialism.
My terms were clearly defined and primary and secondary causation were not terms I used.
No, truth is true regardless of whether any agent is capable of making choices.
Love could be defined as an emotion one feels or as a disposition one has towards a thing or as actions one does in service of a thing. None of those definitions would require free will.
I don't think so. No free will necessarily leads to no moral accountability and that should be evident. Determinism usually assumes materialism. If you have another worldview then let's hear it. What other causes are there beside material causes and how are they justified?
You're arguing on a subject where those terms apply. Just because you didn't use them because you didn't know them and can't make the proper distinction, that doesn't mean they are not relevant. That's exactly why I brought it up, because this this will help you understand how God being the primary cause of everything doesn't make him the secondary cause that led to evil coming into the world.
Knowledge of truth requires choice and evaluation. This is in the sphere of epistemology. Truth's ontological existence is another matter. But since you affirm the realist position, in what way does objective truth exist and what is it grounded in?
What is an emotion and what causes it? If it's simply a causally determined reaction to outside stimuli, then it's an instinct no different than any other instinct or mechanism in the body (or in nature as a whole, because there's no meaningful distinction between what you call a human and the other causally determined instances of matter - dominos - in the universe).
PS: Come to think of it, the whole notion of evil makes no sense under determinism. There are zero objective moral values possible if strict determinism is true. Morality presupposes the ability to choose the good over not-good (evil). This ties in to culpability and moral responsibility. So your entire argument is self-refuting.
Here's the main argument refuting determinism in under a minute which I went over: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NA2mYO0CwQM
Citation needed. Philosophers don't agree on where morality comes from and likewise they won't be able to agree on where moral accountability comes from. And while most Christians would probably have your view that moral accountability is based on people having free will, Paul directly addresses the issue with the opposite answer:
Quite clearly here in Romans 9:19-23 he responds to your objection: How could God hold people morally accountable whose choices have been pre-determined by God? His answer is that God can do what he wants with his creation just like a potter can create a pot for the purpose of destroying it.
So not even your own apostle believes that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Hence you were inappropriately conflating the two things.
Mental causes, logical causes, laws of the universe, and potentially divine intervention and other things outside the universe.
You still didn't point out which premise of my argument was wrong.
Motte and bailey fallacy. We weren't talking about knowledge of truth, just the existence of truth. And since you asked it's based on how things are. But I don't see why knowledge of truth would require free will. For example if knowledge is defined along the lines of justified true belief then none of those elements seem to require free will. You can believe something because your mind was deterministically put into that state of belief.
Let's suppose it's a type of mental state and it can be caused by prior mental states and inputs to the mind through bodily senses. Where is free will required for this?
Not true because humans have minds and dominos do not.
https://scored.co/c/Conspiracies/p/1ARwwogdGc/round-table-free-will-does-it-ex/c/4eZDpIRpjE1
You and u/Zyxl are arguing a semantic, primarily the meaning of "cause", but also perceived but unnecessary attributes of limited freewill. The related points above indicate the direction of resolution.
I think I presented the defeater already:
The "defeater" would be the many, many texts about God controlling everything. He controls some things by giving us relatively free control and by buffering those things where he chooses that we don't get exactly what we will. Our control when effective is a subset of his control, confluent. Ineffectivenesses are both his choice to make some as marred, dishonored vessels and the vessels' choice to resist the good, because those two choices are the same freedom from different perspectives. We might say that our choosing God is God's choosing God, and our choosing evil is God's choosing the good that some choices be partly thwarted, and the good that evil choices be buffered in their ability to harm anyone. Thus when another is harmed by my choice, I'm responsible for the evil I intended (which I couldn't fully carry out), but God is responsible for what he chooses to allow in his grace toward me (partial freewill) and toward the victim (not giving suffering beyond what can be borne and is fitting to the overall narrative).
Ultimately, those who reject the "proorizo" texts are weakening their view of God when a more robust answer to theodicy is available.