This is an interesting one to focus on because (while the premise of this book is its own tangent) the table presents a case as if Talmudic religion is literally contrary to what real Torah faith should be (which both Judaism and Christianity aspire to). Talmud is supposedly to explicate Torah and set boundaries around it without contradicting it; like other explications, it can be casuistic at times, but this is not due to illogic. If there is a casuistry it's because it has broad support as a positive moral boundary in the original rabbinical community and afterward. So we need to find both what's misrepresented as contradictory and what's the degree to which Talmud takes improper liberties with Torah. (For instance, Jesus pointed out that "hate your enemy" was not in Torah but had gotten confused with it in the Talmudic Mishna period.)
Sanhedrin 54b-55a does not say "If one committed sodomy with a child of less than nine years, no guilt is incurred." It begins by quoting Lev. 18:22, the passage which it supposedly rejects, and continues: "With regard to what do disagree? Rav holds any that applies to one who engages in intercourse applies to one who engages in intercourse, and any that does not apply to one who engages in intercourse does not apply to one who engages in intercourse. And Shmuel holds: It is written: As with a woman. It is taught in accordance with of Rav: A male aged nine years and one day, ... liable." Also: "Rav says: Does not deem the intercourse of one who is less than nine years old like one who is nine years old." Unlike rape, homosexuality is being defined only as an adult state, and so the difference is that someone nine or under is regarded only as a victim of forbidden intercourse, which is treated separately under rape law as per Deut. 22:22-27, but someone over nine is also regarded as (at minimum) a passive sodomite. (Shmuel, the minority, wanted to count the child a sodomite if over three.) So the quote mistakenly infers that, because it is not tried as capital sodomy, there is no other punishment for the rapist, which is false. There is no statement about guilt not being incurred, there is only the silence about liability for adult sodomy.
Sanhedrin 64a does not say unqualified that "He who gives of his seed to Molech incurs no punishment." Actual text: "One who gives of his offspring to Molekh is not liable unless he hands over to the Molekh and passes through the fire. He handed over to the Molekh but did not pass through the fire, he passed through the fire but did not hand over to the Molekh, he is not liable, unless he hands over to the Molekh and passes through the fire." This is a straightforward definition of the crime (cited from Lev. 20:3-4 in 64b) having two parts, consent and injury. If one part is missing (the child was not committed to the fire despite parental intent to, or the child was committed to the fire despite parental intent against), the parent has not committed the crime. In the first case the parent has not crossed the threshold of injury, in the second case someone else crossed the threshold and can be tried as a kidnapper. To treat this simple legal definition as if a permission by cutting the text short is inappropriate. The Talmud doesn't condone generic "giving to Molekh" by defining a point at which the court takes action; if someone had ill intent but stopped short of the criminal boundary that person would still be both considered liable to heaven and triable for capital idolatry in other ways.
Sanhedrin 66a is accurately quoted: "One who curses his father or his mother is not liable unless he curses them with the name .... When he blasphemes the name he shall be put to death. Why the verse state The name? Taught concerning one who curses his father or his mother, that he is not liable unless he curses them with the name." The explanation of this dictum cites Lev. 24:16, which states twice the blasphemer of the name shall be executed. Menahem ruled that the repetition should be meaningful, and that therefore Moses is explicitly teaching that besides cursing God directly, it is also a capital crime to blaspheme the name indirectly; and so he ruled that the indirect form must be stated for the purpose of qualifying, or narrowing, or defining, the meaning of Ex. 21:17, cursing parents. This is clearly intended for the purpose of mercy, to make a capital crime harder to commit, especially one that has specific temptation for young adults. Should we object that the merciful application of a capital code, using a valid technicality, nullifies the code? I don't think so, since otherwise we'd be arguing that a teenager is at risk of execution for any single untoward statement that can be ruled a curse in a very broad way rather than the narrowly fenced way described here.
Sanhedrin 101a is accurately quoted: "One may whisper incantations of snakes and scorpions on Shabbat .... One may not consult the words of demons on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: Even during the week, prohibited .... Demons of oil and demons of eggs, it is permitted to consult them; but due to that they deceive." The word for consulting is the same as in Deut. 18:10-11; the Talmudic word for demon here is first H7700 (meaning "shade" as in Deut. 32:17), and second H8269 twice meaning "prince", while in Deut. 18 it is H178 meaning a "murmurer". The type of incantation considered is the recitation of either a Bible verse or another formula to invoke healing power. Therefore the idea is that, though enforcement against demonism was very strict, certain practices were considered too minor (and probably widespread) to make significant issues, and these included speaking a formula over a snakebite on Sabbath (due to the emergency) and asking questions of the "princes" of eggs and oil (folk augury). The rabbis argued that the matters were merely "bad ideas" rather than enforceable. One of the known weaknesses of the Talmud is its frequent dependence on folk spiritism, so here the question is whether the exemption of minor lapses from capital crimes of idolatry was worth pursuing for the peace of those who practiced them. This question should not be answered from within our culture, but should be considered in light of the prevalence of the practice in its origin culture as indicated by the Talmud and other sources.
Yevamot 59b does not say "Women having intercourse with a beast can marry a priest, the act is but a mere wound." Actual text: "Rabbi Shimi bar Hiyya said: Had intercourse with an animal, fit for the priesthood. This is also taught: Had intercourse with one who is not a man, although stoning, fit for the priesthood. When Rav Dimi came he said: An incident, a certain girl in Hitlu who was sweeping the house, and a village dog sodomized her from behind. And Rabbi permitted her to the priesthood." This personal ruling is that it's anecdotally possible that intercourse with a male animal may not be intentional (later argument may apply this to demons as well). Stoning is still stated to apply if the act is intentional and forewarned against. This does not condone bestiality but cites a legal case where it was ruled unintentional; the quote makes it sound as if intentional bestiality was permitted, which is contradicted by the reference to stoning.
Avodah Zarah 62b does not say: "A harlot's hire is permitted, for what the woman has received is legally a gift." Actual text: "And in the corresponding payment, permitted. As it is taught: Gave but did not engage in intercourse with her ... permitted her payment. Since he did not engage in intercourse with her, it is merely a gift that he has given her." The text alludes to prostitute wages not being permitted as an offering (Deut. 23:19), and gives the general rule that if a person has not consummated an act of prostitution then an animal in payment would constitute a gift. The discussion into 63a raises various dilemmas such as whether the man intends to consummate the act much later than giving a gift, which might be offered in the meantime, and concludes that different rabbinical case laws are contradictory but "shall stand" as an unresolved dilemma. Does the discussion condone prostitution? No, that is judged elsewhere under Deut. 22:21, as the separable question is limited to when an offered animal is judged to be wages of prostitution.
Sanhedrin 65a does not say unqualified that "One can revile the Divine Name if mentally applying it to some other object." Actual text: "A blasphemer, what action is there? The twisting of his lips is an action .... Is liable only for a matter that involves an action .... And Rabbi Yohanan, what is different? ... A blasphemer is different, since is in the heart." Here Yohanan is the minority view, who believes that blasphemy should not be charged because it is essentially a heart matter (continuing into 65b). The majority view is that a blasphemer is liable for the action of speaking. The quote mistakenly enlarges on Yohanan's minority opinion as if final.
Nedarim 23b does not say unqualified that "One may declare: Every vow which I may make in the future shall be null." Actual text: "One who desires his vows not be upheld the entire year should stand up on Rosh HaShana and say: Any vow that I take in the future should be void .... If he remembers at the time of the vow and says: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, his vow has no substance. He did not say: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, he has uprooted his stipulation and upheld his vow. Rav Huna bar Hinnana intended to teach at lecture. Rava said to him: tanna conceals it in order that not treat vows lightly, and you teach it at lecture?" That is, including 23a, this practice was regulated such that a person who wishes a vow to apply to his "invalidation" context must explicitly state the context at the time of the vow, proving its invalidity and performativeness to the listener. The haggadah that follows shows that vows are to be treated seriously, and so the idea of intending the new year to be a clean slate should not be taught casuistically as an excuse to deceive later. The person who makes a separate annulment and then later vows without informing the audience of that annulment is condemned by the development of the discussion. Thus the context mitigates the then-current practice.
Sanhedrin 78a does not say unqualified that "If ten men smote a man with ten staves and he died, they are exempt from punishment." Actual text: "The Sages taught: Ten people struck with ten sticks and he died, whether simultaneously, whether one after the other, they are exempt .... Rather, in there is sufficient to kill, and another comes and kills him; that is liable." The ruling is disputed, and then the majority judgment is made that when the blows are sufficient to kill but the first did not finish the job, there is still liability under Lev. 24:17. Thus the sentence quoted is out of its context. It remains that if a man was struck simultaneously and it cannot be determined who killed him, it is not regarded as capital, but the men are still liable to his estate under tort law for having injured him.
So the chart presents a consistency that is unusual for those who miscite the Talmud: in each case there is an objection that the Talmudic judgment is too lenient compared to the apparent strictness of the Mosaic law in its brevity. Rows 3-4 are actually valid summaries of the Talmudic context, while others quote accurately but fail to consult the context. Here are the lenient judgments: 1. Sodomy of a boy nine or under is tried only as capital rape and not also as sodomy. 2. Giving a child to Molekh is defined only as including intent and application of fire, though other actions can be tried as generic idolatry. 3. Cursing parents is regarded by a technicality as limited to cursing by the explicit name of God and not capital otherwise. 4. Speaking a formula over a venomous bite on Sabbath, and performing augury on oil and eggs, are regarded as too minor to rise to capital idolatry. 5. Because it's possible for a male animal to rape a girl, as once happened, it is assumed (absent further evidence) that such an event is unintentional and not punished as either capital or prejudicial. 6. A man's gift to a woman is not ruled as prostitution if he doesn't have intercourse with her; if he does, there are unresolved and conflicting judgments about what circumstances might exempt the payment from being capital evidence, such as the gift long preceding the sex act. 7. The idea that verbal blasphemy might not be intentional in the heart is an overruled minority opinion from Yohanan. 8. The practice of asking forgiveness in advance if one should unintentionally break a future vow must be regulated by stating it again at the time a vow is made, i.e., by making clear to the audience that it is not to be taken as a vow. 9. The act of a group is not applied to the law about a single murderer if it is simultaneous (tort law would apply instead), but if there is a sequence of blows then it is capital.
In all cases the Talmud is the merciful text and the Torah if taken alone becomes the judgmental text by contrast! In all nine cases the rabbis are considering defenses that permit them not to apply capital charges (though in at least rows 1-2 they are cases where other capital charges would apply). And this is exactly the position Jesus took with the woman caught in adultery: he knew the crime was capital but he showed the way to extend her mercy by shaming her accusers (who had broken the law about bringing the male forward as well). The point of the Mosaic law was to demonstrate the gravity of sin by its capital charges so that we would learn to hate sin; it was never to create a gotcha environment. Just as in American law, the many defenses available against capital crimes allow us to sift until we are only executing those who have demonstrated for years they have no interest in learning to do right. We too try never to err in our use of capital punishment. Thus the conclusion that the Talmud is sinful in itself or contrary to legitimately merciful exposition of Mosaic law is not sustained by the chart given. We could criticize the Talmud for its irreverent jokes, its insular protectiveness against outsiders, or its extensive demonology and folk spiritism, but its legal judgments have not been evidenced anywhere as constituting permissions to obvious sins.
Repost:
This is an interesting one to focus on because (while the premise of this book is its own tangent) the table presents a case as if Talmudic religion is literally contrary to what real Torah faith should be (which both Judaism and Christianity aspire to). Talmud is supposedly to explicate Torah and set boundaries around it without contradicting it; like other explications, it can be casuistic at times, but this is not due to illogic. If there is a casuistry it's because it has broad support as a positive moral boundary in the original rabbinical community and afterward. So we need to find both what's misrepresented as contradictory and what's the degree to which Talmud takes improper liberties with Torah. (For instance, Jesus pointed out that "hate your enemy" was not in Torah but had gotten confused with it in the Talmudic Mishna period.)
Sanhedrin 54b-55a does not say "If one committed sodomy with a child of less than nine years, no guilt is incurred." It begins by quoting Lev. 18:22, the passage which it supposedly rejects, and continues: "With regard to what do disagree? Rav holds any that applies to one who engages in intercourse applies to one who engages in intercourse, and any that does not apply to one who engages in intercourse does not apply to one who engages in intercourse. And Shmuel holds: It is written: As with a woman. It is taught in accordance with of Rav: A male aged nine years and one day, ... liable." Also: "Rav says: Does not deem the intercourse of one who is less than nine years old like one who is nine years old." Unlike rape, homosexuality is being defined only as an adult state, and so the difference is that someone nine or under is regarded only as a victim of forbidden intercourse, which is treated separately under rape law as per Deut. 22:22-27, but someone over nine is also regarded as (at minimum) a passive sodomite. (Shmuel, the minority, wanted to count the child a sodomite if over three.) So the quote mistakenly infers that, because it is not tried as capital sodomy, there is no other punishment for the rapist, which is false. There is no statement about guilt not being incurred, there is only the silence about liability for adult sodomy.
Sanhedrin 64a does not say unqualified that "He who gives of his seed to Molech incurs no punishment." Actual text: "One who gives of his offspring to Molekh is not liable unless he hands over to the Molekh and passes through the fire. He handed over to the Molekh but did not pass through the fire, he passed through the fire but did not hand over to the Molekh, he is not liable, unless he hands over to the Molekh and passes through the fire." This is a straightforward definition of the crime (cited from Lev. 20:3-4 in 64b) having two parts, consent and injury. If one part is missing (the child was not committed to the fire despite parental intent to, or the child was committed to the fire despite parental intent against), the parent has not committed the crime. In the first case the parent has not crossed the threshold of injury, in the second case someone else crossed the threshold and can be tried as a kidnapper. To treat this simple legal definition as if a permission by cutting the text short is inappropriate. The Talmud doesn't condone generic "giving to Molekh" by defining a point at which the court takes action; if someone had ill intent but stopped short of the criminal boundary that person would still be both considered liable to heaven and triable for capital idolatry in other ways.
Sanhedrin 66a is accurately quoted: "One who curses his father or his mother is not liable unless he curses them with the name .... When he blasphemes the name he shall be put to death. Why the verse state The name? Taught concerning one who curses his father or his mother, that he is not liable unless he curses them with the name." The explanation of this dictum cites Lev. 24:16, which states twice the blasphemer of the name shall be executed. Menahem ruled that the repetition should be meaningful, and that therefore Moses is explicitly teaching that besides cursing God directly, it is also a capital crime to blaspheme the name indirectly; and so he ruled that the indirect form must be stated for the purpose of qualifying, or narrowing, or defining, the meaning of Ex. 21:17, cursing parents. This is clearly intended for the purpose of mercy, to make a capital crime harder to commit, especially one that has specific temptation for young adults. Should we object that the merciful application of a capital code, using a valid technicality, nullifies the code? I don't think so, since otherwise we'd be arguing that a teenager is at risk of execution for any single untoward statement that can be ruled a curse in a very broad way rather than the narrowly fenced way described here.
Sanhedrin 101a is accurately quoted: "One may whisper incantations of snakes and scorpions on Shabbat .... One may not consult the words of demons on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: Even during the week, prohibited .... Demons of oil and demons of eggs, it is permitted to consult them; but due to that they deceive." The word for consulting is the same as in Deut. 18:10-11; the Talmudic word for demon here is first H7700 (meaning "shade" as in Deut. 32:17), and second H8269 twice meaning "prince", while in Deut. 18 it is H178 meaning a "murmurer". The type of incantation considered is the recitation of either a Bible verse or another formula to invoke healing power. Therefore the idea is that, though enforcement against demonism was very strict, certain practices were considered too minor (and probably widespread) to make significant issues, and these included speaking a formula over a snakebite on Sabbath (due to the emergency) and asking questions of the "princes" of eggs and oil (folk augury). The rabbis argued that the matters were merely "bad ideas" rather than enforceable. One of the known weaknesses of the Talmud is its frequent dependence on folk spiritism, so here the question is whether the exemption of minor lapses from capital crimes of idolatry was worth pursuing for the peace of those who practiced them. This question should not be answered from within our culture, but should be considered in light of the prevalence of the practice in its origin culture as indicated by the Talmud and other sources.
Yevamot 59b does not say "Women having intercourse with a beast can marry a priest, the act is but a mere wound." Actual text: "Rabbi Shimi bar Hiyya said: Had intercourse with an animal, fit for the priesthood. This is also taught: Had intercourse with one who is not a man, although stoning, fit for the priesthood. When Rav Dimi came he said: An incident, a certain girl in Hitlu who was sweeping the house, and a village dog sodomized her from behind. And Rabbi permitted her to the priesthood." This personal ruling is that it's anecdotally possible that intercourse with a male animal may not be intentional (later argument may apply this to demons as well). Stoning is still stated to apply if the act is intentional and forewarned against. This does not condone bestiality but cites a legal case where it was ruled unintentional; the quote makes it sound as if intentional bestiality was permitted, which is contradicted by the reference to stoning.
Avodah Zarah 62b does not say: "A harlot's hire is permitted, for what the woman has received is legally a gift." Actual text: "And in the corresponding payment, permitted. As it is taught: Gave but did not engage in intercourse with her ... permitted her payment. Since he did not engage in intercourse with her, it is merely a gift that he has given her." The text alludes to prostitute wages not being permitted as an offering (Deut. 23:19), and gives the general rule that if a person has not consummated an act of prostitution then an animal in payment would constitute a gift. The discussion into 63a raises various dilemmas such as whether the man intends to consummate the act much later than giving a gift, which might be offered in the meantime, and concludes that different rabbinical case laws are contradictory but "shall stand" as an unresolved dilemma. Does the discussion condone prostitution? No, that is judged elsewhere under Deut. 22:21, as the separable question is limited to when an offered animal is judged to be wages of prostitution.
Sanhedrin 65a does not say unqualified that "One can revile the Divine Name if mentally applying it to some other object." Actual text: "A blasphemer, what action is there? The twisting of his lips is an action .... Is liable only for a matter that involves an action .... And Rabbi Yohanan, what is different? ... A blasphemer is different, since is in the heart." Here Yohanan is the minority view, who believes that blasphemy should not be charged because it is essentially a heart matter (continuing into 65b). The majority view is that a blasphemer is liable for the action of speaking. The quote mistakenly enlarges on Yohanan's minority opinion as if final.
Nedarim 23b does not say unqualified that "One may declare: Every vow which I may make in the future shall be null." Actual text: "One who desires his vows not be upheld the entire year should stand up on Rosh HaShana and say: Any vow that I take in the future should be void .... If he remembers at the time of the vow and says: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, his vow has no substance. He did not say: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, he has uprooted his stipulation and upheld his vow. Rav Huna bar Hinnana intended to teach at lecture. Rava said to him: tanna conceals it in order that not treat vows lightly, and you teach it at lecture?" That is, including 23a, this practice was regulated such that a person who wishes a vow to apply to his "invalidation" context must explicitly state the context at the time of the vow, proving its invalidity and performativeness to the listener. The haggadah that follows shows that vows are to be treated seriously, and so the idea of intending the new year to be a clean slate should not be taught casuistically as an excuse to deceive later. The person who makes a separate annulment and then later vows without informing the audience of that annulment is condemned by the development of the discussion. Thus the context mitigates the then-current practice.
Sanhedrin 78a does not say unqualified that "If ten men smote a man with ten staves and he died, they are exempt from punishment." Actual text: "The Sages taught: Ten people struck with ten sticks and he died, whether simultaneously, whether one after the other, they are exempt .... Rather, in there is sufficient to kill, and another comes and kills him; that is liable." The ruling is disputed, and then the majority judgment is made that when the blows are sufficient to kill but the first did not finish the job, there is still liability under Lev. 24:17. Thus the sentence quoted is out of its context. It remains that if a man was struck simultaneously and it cannot be determined who killed him, it is not regarded as capital, but the men are still liable to his estate under tort law for having injured him.
So the chart presents a consistency that is unusual for those who miscite the Talmud: in each case there is an objection that the Talmudic judgment is too lenient compared to the apparent strictness of the Mosaic law in its brevity. Rows 3-4 are actually valid summaries of the Talmudic context, while others quote accurately but fail to consult the context. Here are the lenient judgments: 1. Sodomy of a boy nine or under is tried only as capital rape and not also as sodomy. 2. Giving a child to Molekh is defined only as including intent and application of fire, though other actions can be tried as generic idolatry. 3. Cursing parents is regarded by a technicality as limited to cursing by the explicit name of God and not capital otherwise. 4. Speaking a formula over a venomous bite on Sabbath, and performing augury on oil and eggs, are regarded as too minor to rise to capital idolatry. 5. Because it's possible for a male animal to rape a girl, as once happened, it is assumed (absent further evidence) that such an event is unintentional and not punished as either capital or prejudicial. 6. A man's gift to a woman is not ruled as prostitution if he doesn't have intercourse with her; if he does, there are unresolved and conflicting judgments about what circumstances might exempt the payment from being capital evidence, such as the gift long preceding the sex act. 7. The idea that verbal blasphemy might not be intentional in the heart is an overruled minority opinion from Yohanan. 8. The practice of asking forgiveness in advance if one should unintentionally break a future vow must be regulated by stating it again at the time a vow is made, i.e., by making clear to the audience that it is not to be taken as a vow. 9. The act of a group is not applied to the law about a single murderer if it is simultaneous (tort law would apply instead), but if there is a sequence of blows then it is capital.
In all cases the Talmud is the merciful text and the Torah if taken alone becomes the judgmental text by contrast! In all nine cases the rabbis are considering defenses that permit them not to apply capital charges (though in at least rows 1-2 they are cases where other capital charges would apply). And this is exactly the position Jesus took with the woman caught in adultery: he knew the crime was capital but he showed the way to extend her mercy by shaming her accusers (who had broken the law about bringing the male forward as well). The point of the Mosaic law was to demonstrate the gravity of sin by its capital charges so that we would learn to hate sin; it was never to create a gotcha environment. Just as in American law, the many defenses available against capital crimes allow us to sift until we are only executing those who have demonstrated for years they have no interest in learning to do right. We too try never to err in our use of capital punishment. Thus the conclusion that the Talmud is sinful in itself or contrary to legitimately merciful exposition of Mosaic law is not sustained by the chart given. We could criticize the Talmud for its irreverent jokes, its insular protectiveness against outsiders, or its extensive demonology and folk spiritism, but its legal judgments have not been evidenced anywhere as constituting permissions to obvious sins.