Allow me also to say I appreciate your other postings (and your use of these transcripts). In particular my review of the Ken Ham and Eric Hovind clips indicates that they are (contrary to my other experience with them) being disappointingly presuppositional in a way that we would hope nobody pursues.
There is always a single core presupposition and it is either nihilism or truth: every other form of presupposition or denial thereof is isomorphic to, and resolves to, one of those two options (though the two options can be broken down into many good and bad subcategories). But among people who agree on nihilism, or among people who agree on truth, everything should then be evaluated by evidence. I point people to the facts that the universe testifies first of its uniquenesses and transcendence, then of its power to include more specific testimonies within it, then of our use of facts and logic to select among those testimonies and tentatively, gradually uphold those that explain material the best. This is what leads me to the belief the Bible is at least as trustworthy as other histories, and when I build on the consequences of that belief I eventually get to sufficient inerrancy: I don't start with inerrancy when my audience has doubt about it, and I don't recommend that to anyone.
At the same time, Paul of Paulogia makes at least one mistake: he regards Euclidean parallels as a definition rather than an axiom. Euclid showed, and mathematicians still emphasize, that a small set of axioms is necessary to any system of truth, or else nothing can be proven true. The parallel axiom is that, if two lines have internal adjacent transversal angles under 180 degrees, then they intersect. (Or, if they don't intersect, then the angles are 180 degrees.) His placement of this axiom suggested he realized that it would be uncertain if it were not taken as an axiom. In the 19th century, mathematicians finally asked what geometry would be if the axiom were false instead of true, and they discovered a distinct, but useful, geometry, known as non-Euclidean and hyperbolic; it has some isomorphisms with Euclidean geometry but different definitions and often different results. The current mathematical consensus is that any number of axiom sets can be selected that each have their unique universe of provable statements, but each axiom set is an incomplete model of reality in which the actual axiom is that statements either accord with reality (is true) or do not. Because Paul rightly points out that definitions don't relate to presupposition, he never gets around to his own presuppositions (such as his stated belief that he is fair); the pursuit of fairness is ultimately isomorphic to the presupposition that truth exists.
I hope this helps. Since you seem to be able to see my comments, I refer back to the question: "Is it objectively true (without dependence on subjective framing) that no statements are objectively true, or is it objectively true that one or more statements are in fact objectively true?" I would think this would be an easy question to answer, given your exposure of presuppositionalism that proposes complex axiomatic schemes rather than one simple axiom of truth existing.
Allow me also to say I appreciate your other postings (and your use of these transcripts). In particular my review of the Ken Ham and Eric Hovind clips indicates that they are (contrary to my other experience with them) being disappointingly presuppositional in a way that we would hope nobody pursues.
There is always a single core presupposition and it is either nihilism or truth: every other form of presupposition or denial thereof is isomorphic to, and resolves to, one of those two options (though the two options can be broken down into many good and bad subcategories). But among people who agree on nihilism, or among people who agree on truth, everything should then be evaluated by evidence. I point people to the facts that the universe testifies first of its uniquenesses and transcendence, then of its power to include more specific testimonies within it, then of our use of facts and logic to select among those testimonies and tentatively, gradually uphold those that explain material the best. This is what leads me to the belief the Bible is at least as trustworthy as other histories, and when I build on the consequences of that belief I eventually get to sufficient inerrancy: I don't start with inerrancy when my audience has doubt about it, and I don't recommend that to anyone.
At the same time, Paul of Paulogia makes at least one mistake: he regards Euclidean parallels as a definition rather than an axiom. Euclid showed, and mathematicians still emphasize, that a small set of axioms is necessary to any system of truth, or else nothing can be proven true. The parallel axiom is that, if two lines have internal adjacent transversal angles under 180 degrees, then they intersect. (Or, if they don't intersect, then the angles are 180 degrees.) His placement of this axiom suggested he realized that it would be uncertain if it were not taken as an axiom. In the 19th century, mathematicians finally asked what geometry would be if the axiom were false instead of true, and they discovered a distinct, but useful, geometry, known as non-Euclidean and hyperbolic; it has some isomorphisms with Euclidean geometry but different definitions and often different results. The current mathematical consensus is that any number of axiom sets can be selected that each have their unique universe of provable statements, but each axiom set is an incomplete model of reality in which the actual axiom is that statements either accord with reality (is true) or do not. Because Paul rightly points out that definitions don't relate to presupposition, he never gets around to his own presuppositions (such as his stated belief that he is fair); the pursuit of fairness is ultimately isomorphic to the presupposition that truth exists.
I hope this helps. Since you seem to be able to see my comments, I refer back to the question: "Is it objectively true (without dependence on subjective framing) that no statements are objectively true, or is it objectively true that one or more statements are in fact objectively true?" I would think this would be an easy question to answer, given your exposure of presuppositionalism that proposes complex axiomatic schemes rather than one simple axiom of truth existing.