I brought up victimization because it was a concept you introduced into the hypothetical asking whether the person was a victim. But this has gone far beyond what the initial point was, which was that there are still infinite amounts of actions one can take even if there is no evil. You contend "less good" would become evil in such a system, I don't agree. Regardless free will could be expressed, with a still infinite number of choices. None of this has to do with a moral test. But, if we grant your presupposition that a moral test is necessary (already a huge concession in this debate) again, why do some face much lesser moral tests than others? Why should we not all face the same tests and given that it's a test, why are we not facing the maximum test we should?

I feel as if we're arguing passed each other. I'm coming at it from an angle of how can we understand the nature of the world, and how we can really know whether it is ideal - this involves trying to conceive of completely different systems of reality, existence of a whole different nature than the one we have here, which I have tried to break down. You seem to be coming at it with the presupposition that the way things are IS the ideal, and trying to reason about ways to make that conclusion fit. And though I accept many of the conditions necessary to make such a presupposition for this debate, then we have to spend time in the weeds. To disregard a logical conclusion of an idea means to discard the principle core of the idea, and to do so when we're talking in theory really undercuts our capacity to understand each other's points. I don't see how we can find further common ground this way

I don't have a lot of time and there is a lot of engagement. I brought up victimization because it was a concept you introduced into the hypothetical asking whether the person was a victim. But this has gone far beyond what the initial point was, which was that there are still infinite amounts of actions one can take even if there is no evil. You contend "less good" would become evil in such a system, I don't agree. Regardless free will could be expressed, with a still infinite number of choices. None of this has to do with a moral test. But, if we grant your presupposition that a moral test is necessary (already a huge concession in this debate) again, why do some face much lesser moral tests than others? Why should we not all face the same tests and given that it's a test, why are we not facing the maximum test we should?

I feel as if we're arguing passed each other. I'm coming at it from an angle of how can we understand the nature of the world, and how can we really know whether it is ideal, you seem to be coming at it with the presupposition that this is ideal, and trying to make that conclusion fit. And though I accept many of the conditions necessary to make such a presupposition for this debate, then we have to spend time in the weeds. To disregard a logical conclusion of an idea means to discard the principle core of the idea, and to do so when we're talking in theory really undercuts our capacity to understand each other's points. I don't see how we can find further common ground this way

I don't have a lot of time and there is a lot of engagement. I brought up victimization because it was a concept you introduced into the hypothetical asking whether the person was a victim. But this has gone far beyond what the initial point was, which was that there are still infinite amounts of actions one can take even if there is no evil. You contend "less good" would become evil in such a system, I don't agree. Regardless free will could be expressed, with a still infinite number of choices. None of this has to do with a moral test. But, if we grant your presupposition that a moral test is necessary (already a huge concession in this debate) again, why do some face much lesser moral tests than others? Why should we not all face the same tests and given that it's a test, why are we not facing the maximum test we should?

I feel as if we're arguing passed each other. I'm coming at it from an angle of how can we understand the nature of the world, and how can we really know whether it is ideal, you seem to be coming at it with the presupposition that this is ideal, and trying to make that conclusion fit. And I accept many of the conditions necessary to make such a presupposition, yet then we have to spend time in the weeds. To discard a logical conclusion of an idea means to discard the principle core of the idea, I don't see how we can find further common ground this way