Free will really needs to be defined in order to have a proper debate about.
For example, if you define free will to simply mean the ability to make "choices" and by a "choice" you mean to pick an option from a variety of possible options then even computers would have free will. If you instead define free will to mean the ability to make a choice in which you could have done otherwise, you need to define what "could have done otherwise" means. A computer could have done otherwise if it were programmed differently or it were hit by a cosmic ray that flipped one of its bits.
Often where this attempt to define free will ends up is with the idea that a person's choices are non-deterministic and thus even a being with perfect knowledge of everything in the present (physical, mental and otherwise) would be unable to know with certainty what choice (whenever you consider a choice really takes place) you will make a fraction of a second later. But this is a problem if you also want to believe the principle of sufficient reason: that nothing can happen without a sufficient reason. Abandoning the principle of sufficient reason you kind of need an alternative explanation for why things don't just constantly happen for no reason, like why doesn't an elephant just appear in my living room every 5 seconds? This idea of free will also appears incompatible with an all-knowing God who is able to interact in time. Because then God would know what choice you will make in the future and be able to tell that to people in the past, thereby contradicting the pre-established fact that no knowledge of things in the present would allow someone to know your choice ahead of time.
Another problem with this definition of free will is that there's an element of your choice that comes from absolutely nowhere for no reason, while any remaining elements of your choice are pre-determined. So which part of your choice comes from you without being predetermined? None of it does. Your choice is part random and part pre-determined, but none of it comes from some non-deterministic part of you.
Free will really needs to be defined in order to have a proper debate about.
For example, if you define free will to simply mean the ability to make "choices" and by a "choice" you mean to pick an option from a variety of possible options then even computers would have free will. If you instead define free will to mean the ability to make a choice in which you could have done otherwise, you need to define what "could have done otherwise" means. A computer could have done otherwise if it were programmed differently or it were hit by a cosmic ray that flipped one of its bits.
Often where this attempt to define free will ends up is with the idea that a person's choices are non-deterministic and thus even a being with perfect knowledge of everything in the present (physical, mental and otherwise) would be unable to know with certainty what choice (whenever you consider a choice really takes place) you will make a fraction of a second later. But this is a problem if you also want to believe the principle of sufficient reason: that nothing can happen without a sufficient reason. Abandoning the principle of sufficient reason you kind of need an alternative explanation for why things don't just constantly happen for no reason, like why doesn't an elephant just appear in my living room every 5 seconds? This idea of free will also appears incompatible with an all-knowing God who is able to interact in time. Because then God would know what choice you will make in the future and be able to tell that to people in the past, thereby contradicting the pre-established fact that no knowledge of things in the present would allow someone to know your choice ahead of time.